Rivero v Rivero Opinion Subsection Two

Learn more about Rivero v Rivero Opinion Subsection Two.

Timeshare required for joint physical custody

The wife filed for divorce in 1977, and trial eventually commenced in 1980. During trial, the parties indicated that they could probably settle the matter. The court stated that it would grant the divorce and bifurcated the property settlement issues. Neither party objected. At the status check six days later, the wife’s counsel informed the court that an agreement had not been reached and requested that the decree not be granted. The husband objected and the matter was continued. After another week the matter was still unresolved. The district court then granted the wife a decree of divorce and ordered that the parties’ community property rights would be determined with the aid of a master. The husband later appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that the County and the named workers had immunity for discretionary, but not ministerial acts. Acknowledging that the conduct of such an investigation "involves numerous decisions on possible approaches," and that "there may be internal departmental operating procedures," the Court concluded that a child abuse investigation is "inherently discretionary" as it involves "personal deliberation, decision and judgment." The Court also found public policy reasons to shield workers from fear of "retaliatory lawsuits" which could diminish the state’s interest in preventing child abuse, and found the workers and CASA program shielded by quasi-judicial immunity. According to a survey of jurisdictions in the May decision, as recounted by the Gaskill court, 13 courts made no distinction between personal and enterprise goodwill, 5 courts held that goodwill is not a part of marital property, and 24 states differentiated between personal and enterprise goodwill. This would appear to be an emerging consensus. 1. When a vacancy occurs before the expiration of any term of office in the Supreme Court or among the district judges, the Governor shall appoint a justice or judge from among three nominees selected for such individual vacancy by the Commission on Judicial Selection. Other courts, however, have found the "automatic" reservation provisions of similar state laws insufficient (in the absence of a clause in the decree stating something that could be interpreted as "treating" the un-mentioned asset) to overcome the congressional ban on partition cases relating to such decrees. See Curtis v. Curtis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (Ct. App. 1992); Hennessy v. Duryea, 955 P.2d 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). 1) If there is a current written parenting time agreement or court order providing for parenting time and/or the parents have split custody, the percentage of overall parenting time for each parent must be calculated as follows: The parties married while the wife was pregnant. The wife claimed that she told the husband the father was another man; the husband admitted that wife never told him that he was the father of the child. The parties cohabited intermittently until separating when the child was three. The wife relocated to Iowa, where she raised the child alone, was on welfare, and attended school. The parties discussed reconciliation in 1990, but the attempt, in Las Vegas, lasted only 30 days. The wife filed for divorce. The Supreme Court rejected the wife’s claim as well. The Court concluded that the wife failed to rebut the presumption of gift by clear and convincing evidence. The Court noted that when separate funds of a spouse were used to acquire property in the names of the husband and wife as joint tenants, it was presumed that a gift of one-half of the value of the joint tenancy property was intended which could only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence citing to Gorden v. Gorden, 93 Nev. 494, 497, 569 P.2d 397 (1977). The Court held that the wife’s testimony, standing alone, was insufficient to rebut the presumption of gift. Legal custody involves having basic legal responsibility for a child and making major decisions regarding the child, including the child's health, education, and religious upbringing. Mack v. Ashlock, 112 Nev. 1062, 1067, 921 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1996) (Shearing, J, concurring); Hearing on S.B. 188 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 61st Leg. (Nev., Feb. 12, 1981). Sole legal custody vests this right with one parent, while joint legal custody vests this right with both parents. Mack, 112 Nev. at 1067, 921 P.2d at 1262 (Shearing, J. concurring); Cal. Fam. Code §§ 3003, 3006 (West 2004)[2] (defining sole and joint legal custody). Joint legal custody requires that the parents be able to cooperate, communicate, and compromise to act in the best interest ofthe child. See Mosley v. Figliuzzi, 113 Nev. 51, 60-61, 930 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1997) (stating that if disagreement between parents affects the welfare of the child, it could defeat the presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child and warrant modifying a joint physical custody order); Hearing on S.B. 188 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 61st Leg. (Nev., Apr. 2, 1981) (discussing that joint legal custody requires agreement between the parents). In a joint legal custody situation, the parents must consult with each other to make major decisions regarding the child's upbringing, while the parent with whom the child is residing at that time usually makes minor day-to-day decisions. See Mack, 112 Nev. at 1067, 921 P.2d at 1262 (Shearing, J., concurring) (discussing that the parents can bring unresolved disputes before the court); Hearing on S.B. 188 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 61st Leg. (Nev., Feb. 12, 1981) (comments of Senator Wagner and Senator Ashworth) (discussing that both parents are involved with making major decisions regarding the children, and if they cannot agree, the courts will settle their disputes); Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767, 777-78 (Ky. 2003) (explaining that in a joint legal custody arrangement, the parents confer on all major decisions, but the parent with whom the child is residing makes the minor day-today decisions), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Fowler v. Sowers, 151 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Frances v. Frances, 266 S.W.3d 754, 756-57 (Ky. 2008), and Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759, 768 (Ky. 2008). 65279;The husband filed a motion requesting that the child be named his "defacto child"; the wife opposed and requested blood tests. A referee heard the motion and recommended an order that the case be found "similar to Frye v. Frye, 103 Nev. 301,738 P.2d 505 (1987) based on the conduct of the parties," and that the husband "should be declared the real father." The district court sustained the wife's objection and ordered blood tests, which conclusively proved the husband's non-paternity. On return to the court, however, the district court found that the wife had failed to rebut a conclusive presumption of California Evidence Code section 621, and further ruled that the wife was equitably estopped from denying the husband's paternity. nbsp; The below paragraph secures to the former spouse a survivorship interest equal to what the former spouse WOULD receive if there was NO survivorship interest and the former spouse was receiving a share of the maximum monthly retirement payable to the Member. 65279;For many years, members of Congress introduced "concurrent receipt" bills of various sorts seeking to repeal, to a greater or lesser extent, the requirement of waiver of longevity retired pay in order to receive disability pay. Of course, any such program would cost the government the entirety of the additional VA payment, which is why it was resisted so strenuously for so long. This legal note is from Marshal S. Willick, Esq., 3591 E. Bonanza Road, Ste 200, Las Vegas, NV 89110. If you are receiving these legal notes, and do not wish to do so, let me know by emailing this back to me with "Leave Me Alone" in the subject line. Please identify the email address at which you got the email. Your State would be helpful too. In the mean time, you could add this to your email blocked list. And, of course, if you want to tell me anything else, you can put anything you want to in the subject line. Thanks. The survivor of a member who died while still on active duty is not necessarily excluded from receiving SBP benefits. The Finance Centers will honor a memberfs election to treat a former spouse as the SBP beneficiary if the member died after: (1)@becoming eligible to receive retired pay; (2) qualifying for retired pay but not yet having applied for or been granted that pay; or (3) completing twenty years of service, but not yet completing ten years of active commissioned service needed for retirement as a commissioned officer.3 The procedural requirements are the same as in other cases. 5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court orders provides for the payment of an amount which exceeds the amount of disposable retired pay available for payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1 ),or which, because of previously served court orders or legal process previously served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an amount that exceeds the maximum am aunt permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason. However, such order shall be considered to be fully satisfied for purposes of this section by the payment to the spouse or former spouse of the maximum amount of disposable retired pay permitted under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction is not reestablished if, after the child the parents, and all persons acting as parents leave the State, the non-custodial parent returns. As subsection (b) provides, once a State has lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, it can modify its own determination only if it has jurisdiction under the standards of Section 101 . . . . The wife filed for divorce in 1977, and trial eventually commenced in 1980. During trial, the parties indicated that they could probably settle the matter. The court stated that it would grant the divorce and bifurcated the property settlement issues. Neither party objected. At the status check six days later, the wife’s counsel informed the court that an agreement had not been reached and requested that the decree not be granted. The husband objected and the matter was continued. After another week the matter was still unresolved. The district court then granted the wife a decree of divorce and ordered that the parties’ community property rights would be determined with the aid of a master. The husband later appealed. The USFSPA has included a savings clause since its original passage, intended to prevent misapplication of the law to subvert existing divorce court orders: The district court ordered that the daughter’s name be changed from Russo to Russo-Gardner. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court quoted Magiera v. Luera, 106 Nev. 775, 802 P.2d 6 (1990) that the "burden is on the party seeking the name change to prove by clear and compelling evidence, that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates a name change." Id. at 291. No apparent evidence was presented concerning the best interests of the child concerning the name change, therefore the lower court’s decision was reversed.

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